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Jochen Abr. Frowein* 
I. INTRODUCTION-THE EUROPEAN TRADITION: RECOGNITION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT 
The conception of fundamental rights as natural rights of 
human beings developed in European legal thinking mainly in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Locke, Jean-Jac-
ques Rousseau, and also Immanuel Kant should be mentioned.1 
But it was in the new world that the principles of fundamental 
human rights were first put into practice. 2 A little more than ten 
years after the first American declarations, the "Declaration des 
droits de l'homme et du citoyen" was adopted in Paris; it re-
mains part of French constitutional law today. 3 But, unlike the 
development in the United States, the French guarantees could 
t Thomas M. Cooley Lecture delivered at the Univer~ity of Michigan Law School on 
Nov. 1, 1983. 
• Director, Max Planck Institute for Public International Law, Heidelberg; Professor, 
University of Heidelberg; Vice-President, European Commission of Human Rights. 
I. See Oestreich, Die Entwicklung der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, in 
BETTERMANN-NEUMANN-NIPPERDEY, DIE GRUNDRECHTE Vol. 1/1, 1966, at 1; Shestack, The 
Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, LEGAL AND 
Poucv lssuEs 69 (T. Meron ed. 1984). · 
2. See The Bill of Rights, U.S. CoNsT. amends. 1-X; The Virginia Bill of Rights 
(1776), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 
1829-30, at 895-96 (1830). 
3. By the reference in the preamble of the constitution of 1958 which reads: 
Le Peuple fran<;ais proclame solennellement son attachement aux Droits de 
/'Homme et aux principes de la souverainete nationale tels qu'ils sont defi.nis 
par la Declaration de 1789, confi.rmee et completee par le preambule de la Con-
stitution de 1946 .... 
(The French people solemnly proclaim their commitment to the Rights of Man 
and the principles of national sovereignty such as they are defined by the Decla-
ration of 1789, confirmed and completed by the preamble of the Constitution of 
1946.) 
CONST. (Fr.) preamble. 
The Conseil Constitutionnel decided for the first time in 1970 that the preamble and 
thereby the declaration is binding constitutional law. See Judgment of June 19, 1970, 
Con. const., Fr., 1971 Revue du Droit Public 203. 
5 
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not be enforced by judges. The legislature was seen as the last 
arbiter of whether or not a specific regulation could be accepted 
as compatible with the bill of rights. 4 As soon as the legislature 
had adopted a law, that law could not be challenged. In 1958 a 
very limited challenge became possible, through the Conseil 
Constitutionnel, but only before the formal promulgation of the 
law. 5 
In Germany the first bills of rights were introduced in the 
early nineteenth century, after the conclusion of Napoleon's in-
vasion. 6 A good example is the constitution of Baden; the Ger-
man state bordering France adopted a constitution in 1818.7 
Most of the German states guaranteed the rights to life and lib-
erty, to the enjoyment of property, and to equality under the 
law by the beginning or the middle of the century. But as in 
France, judicial protection of these rights was impossible against 
the legislature and was rather weak against the administration. 
Although recent research has revealed that in a number of cases 
courts have protected rights, for instance, the freedom of reli-
gion, against administrative decisions, the main function of the 
guarantee of rights was to influence the legislature and to pro-
vide guidance or even a program of reform. 8 
When the German Empire was founded in 1871 as a federal 
state, with the states having a very strong position, no federal 
bill of rights was adopted, mainly because the unitary influence 
of such a guarantee was seen as unacceptable. It may be of inter-
est that the German Empire in fact brought about important 
effects of legal unification later through legislation in the field of 
fundamental rights, for instance freedom of religion and free-
dom of movement. 9 
Why do I mention these historic examples? I want to show 
that on the European continent an important tradition has long 
existed concerning bills of rights. What was lacking, until re-
cently, was real judicial protection, especially against the legisla-
4. For the French tradition, see J.-L. QuERMONNE, LE GouvERNEMENT DE LA FRANCE 
SOUS LA VE REPUBLJQUE 333-402 (1980). 
5. P.E. GoosE, DIE NoRMENKONTROLLE DURCH DEN FRANZOSISCHEN CoNSEIL CONSTITU-
TIONNEL (Schriften zum offentlichen Recht Bd. 212, 1973). 
6. Scheuner, Die rechtliche Tragweite der Grundrechte in der deutschen Verfas-
sungsentwicklung des 19. Jahrhunderts, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR E.R. HUBER 139 (1973), re-
printed in u. SCHEUNER, STAATSTHEORIE UNO STAATSRECHT 633 (1978). 
7. See 1 E.R. HUBER, DoKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 156 
(1961). 
8. See Scheuner, supra note 6. 
9. Huber, Grundrechte im Bismarckschen Reichssystem, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR U. 
ScHEUNER 163 (1973). 
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ture. This protection came into existence after the First World 
War in Austria and, to a very limited extent, in Germany.10 Only 
after the Second World War did Europe experience a change 
which led to the introduction of judicial protection of fundamen-
tal rights in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Italy, to a lim-
ited extent in France, and more recently in Spain and Portu-
gal. 11 Britain, without a written constitution, stands apart. 
Ireland, though belonging to the common law tradition, has ac-
cepted the American example. The Irish Supreme Court has ju-
risdiction for judicial review on the· basis of fundamental 
rights. 12 
When the European Convention of Human Rights was signed 
in 1950, did the countries realize that they had introduced a le-
gal revolution? I believe not. The ratifying nations believed that 
the rather general principles enshrined in this international bill 
of rights already were well-protected in all states. How could a 
country like Britain, with her proud history of protecting the 
liberties of Englishmen, see any danger in ratifying the Conven-
tion? While it was important for the ratifying nations to state 
that the European countries, including the liberated western 
part of Germany, agreed on basic principles, it was taken as a 
matter of course that these principles were well-protected in all 
the old European democracies. 
II. THE IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION: AN EMERGING TRADITION 
OF JUDICIALLY-ENFORCEABLE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
For a long time those who had prepared and signed the Con-
10. For the historical development in Germany, see Friesenhahn, Die 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch land, 111 
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 88, 92 (Beitriige zum ausliindischen of-
fentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht No. 36, 1962); Scheuner, Die Uberlieferung der deut-
schen Staatsgerichtsbarkeit im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, in 1 BuNDESVERFASSUNGSGE-
RICHT UND GRUNDGESETZ 1 (C. Starck 1976). For the development in Austria, see 
Melichar, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Osterreich, in VERFASSUNGSGERICHTS-
BARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 439 (Beitriige zum ausliindischen offentlichen Recht und 
Volkerrecht No. 36, 1962). 
11. For Italy, see Sandulli, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Italien, in 
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 292 (Beitriige zum ausliindischen of-
fentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht No. 36, 1962); for Spain, see Villal6n, Zwei Jahre 
Verfassungsrechtsprechung in Spanien, 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES ()FFENT-
LICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 70 (1983); for Portugal, see Thomashausen, Der 
Freiheitsbegri/f, die Grundrechte und der Grundrechtsschutz in der neuen Portugiesi-
schen Verfassung vom 2 April 1976, 8 EUROPAISHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 1 (1981). 
12. See generally J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 219 (1980) (discussing article 
34.3.2 of the Irish Constitution). 
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vention proved right. The Convention entered into force on Sep-
tember 3, 1953; the United Kingdom was the first country to 
ratify.· One may say that for almost twenty years the Convention 
remained a sleeping beauty, frequently referred to but without 
much impact.13 During this time, some amendments were made 
to the Austrian and German codes of criminal procedure but 
they were viewed as not very important. 14 But after 1973 things 
changed rapidly. Today, there are few countries that have been 
subject for some time to the jurisdiction of the Commission on 
the basis of individual applications1 ~ that have not been found 
in violation of the Convention at least once. Several states with 
proud records of protecting fundamental rights, such as Britain 
and Belgium, have had to comply with several Court judgments 
establishing a violation of the Convention and granting compen-
sation to the applicant. 
How is this dramatic change in direction to be explained? I 
leave aside those cases where, under emergency conditions, se-
curity forces went beyond what is permissible under article 3 
outlawing inhuman treatment. 16 That, unfortunately, can hap-
pen anywhere. Much more interesting are the cases in which 
Convention organs have found that the application of a particu-
lar national law has violated a specific right guaranteed in the 
Convention. Let me mention four examples: 
1. A prisoner could bring a suit in a court of law only if 
authorized by the Home Secretary. Commission and 
Court found a violation of article 6 guaranteeing access to 
court in civil matters. 17 
2. A mother of an illegitimate child was not the legal 
mother before she had recognized the child. This was 
•13. Statistics show that in 1973 the Commission adopted 3 reports in admissible 
cases under Art. 31, 10 in 1978, 21 in 1981, and 21 in 1983. Of the 70 judgments of the 
Court delivered up to July 13, 1983, 40 were rendered during the last five years. See 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS 11 (1983). 
(DH (84) 1). 
14. The general limit for detention on remand in Article 121 of the German Code on 
Criminal Procedure, see THE GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (H. Niebler trans. 
1965) (American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 10), was introduced because of cases 
brought under art. 5, para. 3 of the Convention. 
15. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("The Commission may receive petitions ... 
from any person . . . claiining to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Con-
tracting Parties of the rights set forth in this convention .... ") [hereinafter cited as 
Convention]. 
16. One of the most prominent cases is Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25 
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978). 
17. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 524 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1975). 
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found to be a violation of her right to respect for her 
family life. 18 
3. An accused, convicted in the first instance, did not 
get a free defense counsel for an appeal limited to legal 
questions because the court, on the basis of a statute, 
found the free defense counsel to be unnecessary. Com-
mission and Court found a violation of article 6, para-
graph 3(c), which grants the right to a free defense coun-
sel if the accused cannot pay and the interests of justice 
so require. 19 
4. People interned on the basis of mental illness could 
not get court control, either because there was no rem-
edy, 20 or the remedy was of a merely formal nature.21 No 
court proceeding could consider the lawfulness of the de-
tention. Commission and Court found a violation of arti-
cle 5, paragraph 4, the habeas corpus rule of the 
Convention. 
9 
I have chosen these examples because it may well be that in 
1960 both the Commission and the Court would have found a 
way to uphold the rules underlying these national decisions. The 
arguments that prisoners ought to be subject to inherent limita-
tions on their freedom; that "family" as defined under article 8 
excludes the "illegitimate" family; that the "interests of justice" 
do not require free defense counsel on appeal of a point of law; 
and that the special difficulties of establishing mental illness 
may require detention without court control all could have 
served as justifications for the rules concerned. What are the 
reasons behind the new approach of Commission and Court? 
A probable first reason is a growing awareness that violations 
of fundamental rights under the Convention, like violations in a 
national context with an existing bill of rights, should not be 
seen as a tragedy in itself but rather as a failure which should be 
remedied. The Convention is viewed as a remedy which should 
be used as effectively as possible. 
This attitude probably could have developed only_ after a pe-
riod of time during which the member states became accus-
tomed to the procedure before Commission and Court and de-
veloped a certain confidence in those proceedings. And I would 
18. See Marckx v. Belgium, 2 E.H.R.R. 330 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979). 
19. See Pakelli v. Germany, 6 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1983). 
20. See Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 E.H.R.R. 387 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 
1979). 
21. See X v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.R.R. 188 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981). 
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suggest that the interstate application brought by Ireland 
against the United Kingdom played a role in this change of per-
spective which cannot be underestimated. 22 It was established 
that even a country like Britain is not above the possibility of 
being found in violation of the Convention, even of article 3 for-
bidding inhuman treatment. The Convention had to be used to 
protect people in reality. 
Judicial activism may of course be dangerous, especially in an 
international context. Can these developments be analyzed as 
instances of judicial activism? Much depends on the perspective 
one has. The best check against unjustified activism would seem 
to be a strong consensus in Commission and Court composed of 
lawyers with different backgrounds, representing different legal 
traditions. All my examples concern cases where a large majority 
came to the conclusion that a violation had occurred. 
Of course, doubts may still exist. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice criti-
cized the majority in his dissent in the Tyrer case23 concerning 
judicial corporal punishment, for using article 3 "as a vehicle for 
indirect penal reform, for which it was not intended."24 In Tyrer, 
Commission and Court by very large majorities found judicial 
corporal punishment-birching-to be degrading treatment in 
violation of article 3. 25 Here we see a very basic disagreement 
over the judicial character of the Convention. How could one 
doubt that bills of rights in many countries' legal systems have 
proved and should prove to be "vehicles of indirect penal 
reform"? 
Hans Huber, a very highly regarded Swiss constitutional law-
yer, has described fundamental rights as a type of counter-
movement built into a legal system. 26 It may not be out of pro-
portion to call them a sort of conscience within the legal order 
which should control and correct developments of the normal 
lawmaking procedures. At least when it represents a strong con-
sensus, a Convention decis'ion upholding fundamental rights will 
comport roughly with the conscience of most European nations, 
without impinging significantly on national autonomy. To this 
22. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Ct. Hurn. Rights 1978). The 
case concerned especially the use of the five so-called "deep interrogation" techniques, 
which the Commission found to be torture, see 19 Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON HuM. RIGHTS 512, 
the Court "only" inhuman treatment. 
23. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hurn. Rights 1978). 
24. Id. at 24 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting). . 
25. Id. at 8-12; see also Tyrer, Report of the Commission of Dec. 14, 1976, at 13-15 
(Eur. Cornrn'n Hurn. Rights) (Application No. 5856/72). 
26. Huber, Uber die Konkretisierung der Grundrechte, in DER STAAT ALS AUFGABE, 
GEDENKSCHRIFT FOR MAX IMBODEN 199, 201 (1972). 
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extent, the Convention will contribute to European integration 
by nurturing the development of a pan-European conscience. Of 
course, the notions of what rights are fundamental cannot be 
petrified at a specific moment_ in time. Such notions have to an-
swer new questions put by new social conditions. And who could 
doubt that these social conditions are influenced by public opin-
ion, awareness of problems and even the general "Zeitgeist"? 
III. SOME WEAKNESSES IN THE CONVENTION'S POWER TO 
PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
If this picture, which may be novel to many of you, looks at-
tractive at first sight for somebody who knows of the achieve-
ments of the United States Supreme Court, let us not forget the 
Convention's very important inadequacies. There are many. 
First, the procedure, calling for hearing by the Commission 
before hearing by Court, is rather cumbersome. We cannot 
change it however. Second, until now, the Strasbourg organs, 
Commission and Court, have been part-time bodies. This creates 
great difficulties. One may doubt, however, whether full-time or-
gans would currently be acceptable to the member States. In 
principle, one European Court of Human Rights with jurisdic-
tion to decide applications would certainly be preferable.27 But 
it does not appear that the ratifying states would be willing to 
agree to that change soon. Also, the argument is made that full-
time judges would lose contact with the realities in the different 
legal systems of the ratifying countries. I personally don't see 
any real problem there. 
The most important drawback of the Convention system is 
the lack of uniformity of the internal applicability of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. 28 The Convention is not in-
ternally applicable in Britain, Ireland, and the Scandinavian 
states. This means that national judges cannot rely on the Con-
vention in these countries. The consequence is, of course, that 
many lawyers will not be familiar with the system. In Britain, 
this lack of familiarity has been overcome during the recent 
years because of the activities of some members of the London 
Bar. One would strongly hope that this weakness of the Conven-
' 27. See Frowein, Zur Fortentwicklung des europiiischen Menschen- und Recht-
rechtsschutzes, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR KARL CARSTENS (forthcoming). 
28. See A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 
(1983). 
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tion system can be terminated. Discussions are occurring in Brit-
ain and some of the Scandinavian countries about whether to 
transform the Convention into the law of the state. I am sure 
that Professor Jacobs will mention these discussions.29 This 
transformation would have great importance. 
In the countries where the Convention is internally applicable, 
its role is rather different. In some jurisdictions the Convention 
is frequently applied by national courts. This is true for Austria, 
where it has the rank of constitutional law, and for Switzer-
land. 30 But the courts also look to the Convention in Germany 
and France. Where internal guarantees of fundamental rights 
are stronger than the guarantees of the Convention, it is clear 
that the Convention's role will be limited. 
The fact that the Convention is not applied internally in sev-
eral countries creates considerable difficulties for the Convention 
organs, because they have no national decision before them that 
answers the questions that must be addressed under the Con-
vention. It is clear that countries that do not apply the Conven-
tion internally will have to answer more frequently before the 
Convention organs. Britain has been found in violation of the 
Convention more often than any other country, a fact that may 
be due to this situation. 
You may ask whether it would be possible to read into the 
Convention's text the obligation to apply the Convention inter-
nally within each ratifying state. Proposals of that sort were 
made rather early on the basis of article 1, according to which 
the parties agree to secure the rights in Section I to "everyone 
within their jurisdiction," and article 13, which states that "ev-
eryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Conven-
tion are violated shall have an effective remedy."31 But one has 
to admit that these provisions also can be interpreted under the 
dualistic theory that recognizes parallel rights in the laws of rati-
fying states. Since it was well-known in 1950 that Britain would 
not apply the Convention internally, an obligation to so apply 
the Convention would have had to be established in much 
clearer terms. The Court has stated recently that no such obliga-
29. See Jacobs, Towards a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 29 
(1984). 
30. For examples, see A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 28, at 93-106, 116-124 (1983). 
31. See Buergenthal, The Effect of the European Convention on Human Rights on 
the Internal Law of Member States, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
79 (International and Comparative Law Quarterly Supplementary Publication No. 11, 
1965). 
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tion exists. 32 
Of course, if one speaks of weak points one must not forget 
that the right of individual application to the Commission, 
under article 25, is not automatic. Only four states have not ac-
cepted the right of individual application: Greece, Turkey, Cy-
prus, Malta. But there is no formal obligation of renewal of the 
right for the other states. Britain has set a very bad example by 
failing to renew article 25 for the Isle of Man, after the decision 
in the Tyrer case.33 Fortunately, as yet no other country has re-
acted to a finding of a violation by failing to renew the right of 
individual application. One would hope that this remains a 
unique example. 
32. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 347 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1983). Para-
graph 113 of the judgment reads: 
The principles that emerge from the Court's jurisprudence on the interpretation 
of Article 13 include the following: 
(a) where an individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a vio-
lation of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have a remedy 
before a national authority in order both to have his claim decided and, 
if appropriate, to obtain redress [see Klass v. Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 2 E.H.R.R. 214, 238 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978)); 
(b) the authority referred to in Article 13 may not necessarily be a judi-
cial authority but, if it is not, its powers and the guarantees which it 
affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is ef-
fective [see Klass, 2 E.H.R.R. at 239); 
(c) although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the require' 
ments of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under do-
mestic law may do so [see, mutatis mutandis, X v. United Kingdom, 4 
E.H.R.R. 188, 205 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981); Van Droogenbroeck v. 
Belgium, 4 E.H.R.R. 443, 467 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1982)); 
(d) neither Article 13 nor the Convention in general lays down for the 
Contracting States any given manner for ensuring within their internal 
law the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the Conven-
tion-for example, by incorporating the Convention into domestic law 
[see Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, 1 E.H.R.R. 617, 631 
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1976)]. 
It follows from the last-mentioned principle that the application of Article 13 
in a given case will depend upon the manner in which the Contracting State 
concerned has chosen to discharge its obligation under Article 1 directly to se-
cure to anyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set out in section 
1. [See Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 
1978).] 
5 E.H.R.R. at 381-82. 
33. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978). 
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IV. RESTRICTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR 
COMMON STANDARDS 
A. The Convention's Requirement of "Lawfulness" 
I would now like to address myself to some specific questions 
concerning the restriction of fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Convention. The Convention itself provides that many of its 
rights may be restricted by law, subject to the satisfaction of 
several requirements. The first requirement for such a restric-
tion is that it be provided for by law, or that it be "lawful," as 
articles 5, 10 and 11 say. What does that mean? There must be a 
law as the basis for the interference with the fundamental rights. 
For somebody brought up in the tradition of the rule of law de-
veloped on the European continent, that seems to be self-evi-
dent. But this is not a necessary conclusion about the nature of 
a fundamental right, as illustrated by the famous case of Ma-
lone. 3" In that case, an English judge chose to apply the negative 
rule that restriction of a fundamental right is legal unless forbid-
den by law and permited secret surveillance of telephone lines. 311 
The Convention organs have rejected this theory in reversing the 
English judge. 36 It seems clear that the reasoning of the English 
judge is erroneous under the Convention's explicit language pro-
tecting the individual against interferences not provided for "by 
law." 
However, as Court and Commission have clearly accepted, 
common law as developed in England and Ireland has the quali-
ty of law in this sense. Common law, like statutory law, should 
be at least to some extent predictable. This is a difficult matter 
which was before the Court and the Commission in the Sunday 
Times case and came before the Commission again in a recent 
case concerning common law crimes.37 In the Sunday Times 
case, the Court rightly stressed that a law must not only be ade-
quately "accessible," but a norm cannot be regarded as a law 
unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the cit-
34. See Malone v. United Kingdom, - E.H.R.R. - (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1984); 
Malone v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 385 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rights 1982). The 
Court confirmed the position of the Commission. The case was decided first in England. 
See Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2), 1979 Ch. 344. 
35. See Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2), 1979 Ch. 344. 
36. Malone v. United Kingdom, - E.H.R.R. - (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1984); Malone 
v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 385 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rights 1982). 
37. See Gay News Ltd. and Lemon v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 123 (Eur. 
Comm'n Hum. Rights 1982). 
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izen to regulate his conduct. 38 He must be able, if need be with 
appropriate advice, to foresee to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances the consequences which a given action may 
entail. The Court had to admit, however, that those conse-
quences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. Experi-
ence shows this to be unattainable. The Court rightly underlines 
that while certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train 
excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with 
changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws inevitably are 
couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague 
and whose interpretation and application are questions of 
practice. 39 
There is an interesting uncertainty to the question of the ex-
tent of the 'responsibility of the Convention organs to determine 
whether national organs have applied their law correctly when 
interfering with fundamental rights. Somebody accustomed to 
systems of internal protection of fundamental rights would have 
no difficulty seeing that the Convention organs can never con-
sider the correctness of the application of the national law, but 
can only determine whether the specific legal basis of a particu-
lar decision was used arbitrarily.40 However, the European Court 
of Human Rights has not adopted this view of the scope of its 
power of judicial review. Some judgments can be interpreted as 
holding that the Court has jurisdiction to determine even the 
lawfulness of the interference under national law.41 This would 
of course be a quite astonishing result, since Commission and 
Court are certainly less well-equipped than national courts to 
decide matters of national law. 
38. According to the Court: 
Firstly the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have 
an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable 
to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: 
he must be able-if need be with appropriate advice-to forsee, to a degree that 
is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail. 
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245, 271 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979). 
39. Id. 
40. See J.A. FROWEIN, DER EUROPAJSCHE GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ UND DIE NATIONALE 
GERICHTSBARKEIT 13 (1983). 
41. See Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 E.H.R.R. 387, 404-06 (Eur. Ct. Hum. 
Rights 1979). 
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B. The Purpose of a Restriction: ls It "Necessary in a 
Democratic Society"? 
In determining whether a particular restriction of a funda-
mental right is compatible with the Convention, Commission 
and Court next must determine whether a national legislature 
has imposed that restriction for one of the permissible aims 
listed in the Convention's specific restrictive clauses. Article 10, 
paragraph 2 makes it possible to restrict freedom of expression 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety; for the prevention of disorder or crime; for the protection 
of health or morals; for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others; for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confidence; or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary. This is a long list which makes it easy to catego-
rize the restriction under one of the headings. Indeed, none of 
the items listed above has caused any difficulties so far for the 
Convention organs. 
Much more difficult, however, is the next and last condition 
for the restrictions. In order to uphold on this final ground, Con-
vention organs must find a restriction "necessary in a demo-
cratic society."42 How far can the control of the Convention or-
gans go in this respect? It seems beyond doubt that necessity 
may not be the same in all twenty-one Convention countries. 
This can be seen easily if one compares such notions as 
"morals," "security of state," "public order." Matters of this sort 
cannot be judged without regard to the specific traditions, condi-
tions and dangers prevailing in a given society. On the other 
hand, it is also clear that the Convention organs must have some 
control.43 
V. THE STANDARD FOR CONVENTION DEFERENCE: A "MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION" FOR NATIONAL LEGISLATURES AND COURTS 
Deciding whether a given restriction of a fundamental right is 
"necessary in a democratic society" thus inevitably calls upon 
the Convention organs to strike a balance between normative 
42. Convention, art. 8. 
43. The reference to a "democratic society" would also seem to imply that it is the 
democratic legislature that has to make the first choice and take the first decision. The 
specific legitimacy of the democratic process concerning the interference with the rights 
guaranteed is recognized here. 
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standards and differing national circumstances. In striking this 
balance, Commission and Court purport to grant national legis-
latures and judicial organs a "margin of appreciation."44 But 
how far have the Convention organs gone to control that margin 
of appreciation? According to the Court, supervision by the Con-
vention organs is not limited to ascertaining whether a state ex-
ercised its discretion "reasonably, carefully and in good faith." 
In the Court's view, even a state so acting remains subject to 
control through the Court's determination of whether the con-
duct is compatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
The problems of exercising such control were quite visible in 
the decisions on the cases of Handyside, 45 Sunday Times46 and 
Dudgeon.47 Handyside concerned the confiscation of porno-
graphic literature. Sunday Times determined the compatibility 
with the Convention of an injunction to publication of an article. 
The national court had threatened the publisher with contempt 
should it have published in the face of an injunction. In Dudg-
eon, the legislation in Northern Ireland on homosexuality was at 
issue. 
A. The Rationality Test of Handyside: Have National 
Authorities· Acted Reasonably and in Good Faith? 
In the case of Handyside, the Court stressed that interna-
tional control is subsidiary and concluded that the English 
courts were entitled to think that the book could have damaging 
results for the morals of children and juveniles. 48 
In the Sunday Times judgment, the majority was of the opin-
ion that when a restriction seeks to protect the authority of the 
judiciary, a court may determine compatibility with the Conven-
tion under far more objective criteria than it may apply to a re-
striction that seeks to protect moral standards. 49 Since the 
Times case raised only the former concern, the Court was not 
44. For a critical evaluation, see O'Donnell, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: 
Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTs. 
Q. 474 (1982), 
45. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1976). 
46. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1979). 
47. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.H.R. 149 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981). 
48. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737, 755-57 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 
1976). 
49. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R. 245, 282 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 
1979). 
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satisfied that the interference was necessary. It stressed the fact 
that responsibility for the thalidomide disaster, which lay at the 
heart of the Sunday Times dispute, raised issues of general pub-
lic interest. The Court came to the final conclusion that· the re-
striction proved not to be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. 
The strong dissent by nine judges50 showed that the violation 
of article 10 established by the judgment had something of an 
accidental nature to it. The minority would have applied the 
formula used in Handyside. According to this rationality test, 
the Court must uphold a restriction imposed by national author-
ities if it determines that they acted in good faith, reasonably, 
and with due care in evaluating the danger to the protectable 
interests listed in paragraph 2 of article 10. To this test the dis-
senters would have added consideration of whether a measure 
restricting freedom of expression is proportional to the legiti-
mate aim pursued. The dissent stressed that the latter consider-
ation looms especially large for any society that seeks to remain 
democratic. They found that the House of Lords was entitled to 
think that the publication of the article in question would have 
detrimental effects upon the due administration of justice in re-
lation to actions pending before the courts at the relevant time. 
B. The Proportionality Test: Is the Restriction of a 
Fundamental Right Proportionate to the Social Need 
Claimed for It? 
Convention organs may consider two possible standards for 
deference to national -organs: the rationality test and the propor-
tionality test. The tension between these two approaches ap-
pears most clearly in the Dudgeon judgment of October 22, 
1981.111 The Court had to consider the legislation on homosexual-
ity in Northern Ireland. Homosexual acts between consenting 
adult males still constituted a crime under Northern Irish legis-
lation. No prosecutions in fact took place, but the applicant in 
the case before the Court had been threatened with prosecution. 
In passing this restrictive legislation, the United Kingdom gov-
ernment apparently had relied on the specific social and cultural 
conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland. The Court stressed 
that the United Kingdom government had acted carefully and in 
50. Id. at 285-95 (dissenting opinion). 
51. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.H.R. 149 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981). 
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good faith. The opinion adds that the government made every 
effort to arrive at a balanced judgment between the differing 
viewpoints before concluding that such a substantial body of 
opinion in Northern Ireland was opposed to a change in the law 
that no further action should be taken. Nevertheless, the Court 
stated that good faith and due care alone could not decide the 
question of whether interference with the applicant's private life 
was "necessary in a democratic society."52 It is for the Court to 
make the final evaluation of whether the reasons it has found to 
be relevant were sufficient in the circumstances. The test the 
Court adopted was whether the interference complained of was 
proportionate to the social need claimed for it. 
In analyzing this matter further, the Court referred to 
changed attitudes towards homosexual behavior. In support of 
its position, the Court noted that in the great majority of the 
member states of the Council of Europe it is no longer consid-
ered necessary or appropriate to subject homosexual practices, 
at least of the kind in question, to criminal sanctions. The Court 
could not overlook the marked changes which had occurred in 
this regard in the domestic law of the member states. The Court 
then stressed that the authorities in Northern Ireland had re-
frained in recent years from enforcing the law _in respect of pri-
vate homosexual acts between competent consenting males over 
the age of twenty-one. No evidence was adduced to show that 
this practice was injurious to moral standards in Northern Ire-
land, or that there has been any public demand for stricter en-
forcement of the law. 
Under these conditions, the Court did not see a "pressing so-
cial need"53 to make such acts criminal offenses, in the absence 
of risk of harm to vulnerable sections of society requiring protec-
tion, or of effects on the public. On the issue of proportionality, 
the Court found that such justifications as existed for retaining 
the law in force unamended were outweighed by the detrimental 
effects that the very existence of the legislation could have on 
the life of a person of homosexual orientation. Although mem-
bers of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be 
shocked, offended, or disturbed by the commission by others of 
private homosexual acts, such a reaction cannot on its own war-
rant the application of penal sanctions when only consenting 
adults are involved. 
The Court here seems to base its reasoning on two considera-
52. Id. at 162-65. 
53. Id. at 167. 
20 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:1 
tions. It is not quite clear which is the prevailing one. On the 
one hand the Court stresses that the legislation in Northern Ire-
land had not been enforced. On the other hand, the Court seems 
to rely on the objective consequences of such a criminal statute 
on a homosexual personality. The latter reasoning is to me 
rather weak. Can it be the Court's or the Commission's task to 
find out whether it is correct to penalize homosexual conduct? 
Determining whether particular behavior ought to be subject to 
criminal sanctions inevitably rests on political, not legal, deci-
sions. Societies traditionally have left such decisions to their leg-
islative bodies, partly because no objective standards can be 
found. The case is quite unlike outlawing a particular form of 
punishment, such as birching, which itself is degrading. The first 
argument, however, which relies on the fact that the criminal 
statute lay unenforced before being raised in this particular case 
as a sword of Damocles, would seem to be sufficient to show that 
. the law really was not necessary, and was therefore 
disproportionate. 
The principle of proportionality is certainly a most important 
criterion. By intelligent application of this principle, Convention 
organs can give some structure to their efforts to strike a balance 
between fundamental rights and national autonomy. Such a bal-
ance gives meaningful content to the "margin of appreciation" 
left to the states under several Convention articles. It seems that 
the Convention organs inevitably will be unable to offer any 
fixed determinations of what constitutes necessity in a demo-
cratic society. It is a difficult line that must be drawn between 
on the one hand watering down the Convention guarantees, and 
on the other hand permitting members of the Commission or 
Court to give effect to their own political or general viewpoints. 
Here again, unanimity or quasi-unanimity of Commission re-
ports or judgments is of crucial importance. If this can be 
reached, it is difficult to argue that it is just an individual posi-
tion which has influenced the procedure. 
VI. TOWARD A EUROPEAN BILL OF RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE 
CONVENTION IN THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
European integration through fundamental rights is already 
occurring at Strasbourg. The process is a slow one. It cannot be 
doubted, however, that a common denominator on many impor-
tant issues concerning the protection of fundamental rights is 
being found through decisions on individual applications. The 
FALL 1984) Integration Through Fundamental Rights 21 
criticism that this may sometimes jeopardize legal certainty is of 
course not without relevance. The Convention organs must al-
ways be careful to remain within the European consensus that 
can be deduced from the legal traditions and developments of 
the member states taken together.64 This can, however, never be 
the lowest common denominator. It must be based on a compar-
ison of the traditions along the lines that have been accepted by 
the formulation of the Convention. 
A. Imposition of an Emerging Consensus by the Convention 
A good example of this process would seem to be the case now 
pending before the Court concerning criminal procedures in the 
absence of the accused. The Italian proceeding at issue in the 
cases of Colozza & Rubinat v. Italy66 is of a peculiar nature, in-
sofar as it must be rare to have a trial of that sort without the 
accused being necessarily aware of it, or at least permitted to 
reopen the proceeding. Mr. Rubinat, a Spanish sailor who had 
been involved in a fight in Genoa, had left the country without 
knowing that a criminal trial would be started against him. He 
was convicted and sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. 
When he consented to extradition from France-apparently 
without getting legal advice, because France would not have ex-
tradited him-he had no remedy whatsoever. The Commission 
found unanimously that his right to a fair trial had clearly been 
violated. Here, the traditions of all the Convention countries ex-
cept Italy viewed such a procedure as grossly unfair to the 
accused. 
B. The Propriety of Imposition 
1. Where the Convention's language is explicit- One may 
put the question whether the Convention system as a whole has 
sufficient legitimacy to interfere with important traditions in the 
legal systems of the member states. But it would seem clear that 
the Convention was drafted as an instrument that should pro-
duce real effects. 66 This is demonstrated in areas where the Con-
54. Mosler, Report on the Results of the Colloquy, in PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN EUROPE 333 (I. Maier ed. 1982). 
·55, Report of the Commission of May 5, 1983 (Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rights) (Applica-
tion Nos. 9024/80, 9317 /81). 
56. The Court has held that the rights protected by the Convention are not "theoreti-
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vention provisions leave little room for interpretation. The mini-
mum rights of the accused under article 6, paragraph 3 are good 
examples. One case where Commission and Court unanimously 
found against the Federal Republic of Germany provides an il-
lustration. 57 Article 6, paragraph 3(e) guarantees the right to a 
free interpreter. Free must mean without having to pay for the 
interpreter. 118 Since there are no conditions attached to the pro-
vision, one can only conclude that free means once and for all. If 
one includes provisions of that sort into a Convention and cre-
ates judicial organs to supervise the application of this Conven-
tion, the result must be clear. A Convention organ failing to give 
effect to such plain language would appear so deferential to na-
tional autonomy as to be practically impotent. 
2. Where the language may be either procedural or substan-
tive- A slightly more difficult case is presented where there is a 
clear provision, but it may be applied in a merely formal or in a 
substantive way. Take the case X v. United Kingdom as an ex-
ample.59 A mentally ill person could bring a habeas corpus pro-
cedure. But in this procedure, the court could only look to the 
order made by the Home Secretary. The court could not control 
the substantive grounds for detention. Could this be viewed as 
conforming with article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention, which 
says that everyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be enti-
tled to a hearing at which the lawfulness of his detention shall 
be decided speedily by a tribunal? Commission and Court came 
to the conclusion that a procedure which could not review the 
substantive ground of the detention could not suffice. The Court 
held that the right to judicial control must not be of such a 
scope as to empower the tribunal to substitute its own discretion 
for that of the decision-making authority. The review must, 
however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which, ac-
cording to the Convention, are essential for the "lawful" deten-
tion of a person on the ground of unsoundness of mind, espe-
cially since the reasons capable of initially justifying such a 
detention may cease to exist. In this case, an interpretation go-
ing beyond a merely formalistic compliance with the rule could 
leave hardly any doubt as to the result. 
Already more difficult may be the cases where Commission 
cal or illusory but practical and effective." Airey v. Ireland, 2 E.H.R.R. 305, 314 (Eur. Ct. 
Hum. Rights 1978). 
57. Luedicke, Belkacem, and Koc v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 E.H.R.R. 149 
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1978). 
58. In the French text it is "gratuitement." 
59. 4 E.H.R.R. 188 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 1981). 
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and Court have interpreted the presumption of innocence under 
article 6, paragraph 2 to bear on the validity of the reasons given 
by criminal courts when assigning the costs of discontinued 
criminal procedures. In Germany, Switzerland and Austria a 
widespread practice still exists where such courts will themselves 
pronounce on the culpability of an accused when they decide to 
discontinue the procedures. Courts do that to justify a decision 
not to reimburse the former accused. In response to this practice 
the Commission started to take the rule concerning the pre-
sumption of innocence seriously, and questioned whether the 
practice could be legal. 60 Two German cases were settled under 
article 28 without a final decision. 61 A Swiss case went before the 
Court after the Commission had unanimously found a violation. 
The Court affirmed the Commission.62 
3. Where the language is ambiguous or deficient- An even 
more difficult level is reached where there is practically no or 
very little guidance in the wording of the Convention. Does the 
right to form and to join trade unions include the right not to 
join them? The argument that the article speaks of a freedom in 
that respect should of course be seen as rather important. But 
on the other hand, a specific clause concerning the negative free-
dom of association existing in the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights63 was not inserted into the Convention. There 
was nevertheless a very broad consensus in Commission and 
Court that article 11 is breached where, only because of the re-
fusal to join a specific trade union, workers are fired from their 
jobs.6 ' It is certain that it was of great influence in Commission · 
and Court that such a system is clearly illegal in almost all Eu-
ropean countries. 
4. Where consensus between nations is lacking- The most 
difficult level is reached where the consensus between the Euro-
pean countries is low or nonexistent. This may prove to be the 
crucial issue for the interpretation of article 6, paragraph 1, 
which guarantees access to a court in the determination of civil 
60. See Neubecker v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 D. & R. 13 (Eur. Cornrn'n 
Hurn. Rights 1976); Liebig v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 D. & R. 58 (Eur. Cornrn'n 
Hurn. Rights 1976). 
61. Neubecker v. Federal Republic of Germany, 8 D. & R. 30 (Eur. Cornrn'n Hum. 
Rights 1977); Liebig v. Federal Republic of Germany, 17 D. & R. 5 (Eur. Cornrn'n Hum. 
Rights 1978). 
62. Minelli v. Switzerland, 5 E.H.R.R. 554 (Eur. Ct. Hum Rights 1983). 
63. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 20(2), G.A. Res. 
217, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1949), reprinted in, 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 535. 
64. Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, 4 E.H.R.R. 38 (Eur. Ct. Hum. 
Rights 1981). 
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rights and obligations. After thirty years, it is still completely 
unclear what is covered by that notion. The Court has held that 
disciplinary procedures terminating or suspending the right of a 
medical doctor to practice, as well as the granting of an expro-
priation permit settling the lawfulness of an eventual expropria-
tion, fall under this rule.65 That means that a wide area of ad-
ministrative law may be included in the notion. How far can 
that go? Only a few European countries have experience with a 
complete system of judicial review of administrative acts by 
courts. Most countries still have a rather ·limited system of such 
judicial review. From a logical point of view, it may be almost 
impossible to distinguish the cases already decided from the 
general area where the state, by administrative devices, regulates 
the liberty of the citizen to avoid dangers for others. The case 
raising that issue in principle may soon come before the Court.66 
The examples I have just given will certainly show that the 
Convention organs frequently have to face the choice between a 
narrow and a wider interpretation. The consensus existing or de-
veloping in the European countries will be of great importance 
for that choice to be made. 
VII. THE CONVENTION AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY: THE INTEGRATION EFFECT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
If one speaks of European integration, one cannot forget the 
European Economic Community. The issue of human or funda-
mental rights in the Community legal system has had different 
phases. Underestimated at first, it was then in danger of being 
overestimated for some time. In a jurisprudence well established 
by now, the European Court of Justice has recognized that the 
fundamental rights protected by the Constitutions of the mem-
ber states form an integral part of Community law.67 Interna-
tional treaties for the protection of human rights, as binding on 
the members of the Community as is the European Convention 
on Human Rights, were ten years ago considered to furnish 
65. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 4 E.H.R.R. 1 (Eur. Ct. Hum. 
Rights 1981); Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, 5 E.H.R.R. 35 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rights 
1982). 
66. It is now pending before the Court in Bentham v. The Netherlands. A majority 
of the Commission found that Art. 6 is not applicable. See 6 E.H.R.R. 283 (Eur. Comm'n 
Hum. Rights 1983). 
67. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur 
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125; Stauder v. City of Yim, 1969 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419. 
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guidelines and indications for the standards to be adopted m 
Community law.68 
The German Federal Constitutional Court was not satisfied 
with the protection of fundamental rights in the Community 
system. A famous decision by this Court,69 and some indications 
that the Italian Constitutional Court could move in the same di-
rection,70 have led to considerable activity by the Community in 
the area of fundamental rights. The political organs of the Com-
munity have subscribed formally to the binding force of funda-
mental rights, including those protected by the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. 71 In addition,the Commission of the 
European Community has also formally proposed in a memoran-
dum that the Community should become a party to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. 72 Whether this will be possible is difficult to evaluate. The 
technical problems are great. As an alternative to a formal acces-
sion, the Community could adopt the substantive provisions of 
the Eur.opean Convention on Human Rights as internal Commu-
nity law by a Community regulation based on article 235.73 This 
would be a practice similar to the old Canadian Bill of Rights. 
Although it may seem doubtful whether this could finally lead to 
judicial review of later regulations, one could at least expect the 
European Court of Justice to view that regulation as confirming 
its earlier jurisprudence about the binding nature of fundamen-
tal rights. 
The discussions concerning the possible accession of the Com-
munity to the European Convention on Human Rights prove 
what the German author Rudolf Smend in 1928 called the inte-
gration effect of fundamental rights. 74 A population may find its 
68. Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 3745 (Prelimi-
nary Ruling); Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219 (Prelim-
inary Ruling). See generally GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN EUROPA (Beitriige zum ausliindi-
schen offentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht No. 72, 1977). 
69. Judgment of May 29, 1974, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 37 Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG] 271; but see Judgment of June 23, 1981, Bundesverfassungsge-
richt, W. Ger., 58 BVerfG 1; for a critical discussion of the first decision, see Frowein, 
Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Bundesuerfassungsgericht, in 2 BuNDESVERFAS· 
SUNGSGERICHT UNO GRUNDGESETZ 187, 201 (1976); concerning the last decision see 
Frowein, Anmerkung des Bearbeiters, 9 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 179 
(1982). 
70. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1973, Corte const., Italy, 1974 Foro It. I 314. 
71. Declaration of Apr. 5, 1977, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1 (1977). 
72. Memorandum of Apr. 4, 1979, BULL. EuR. COMM. (Supp. 1979-80) (No. 2/79). 
73. See J.A. Frowein, Human Rights in International Law and Community Law, in 
HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS 73, 
77 (1979-80 H.L. 362). 
74. R. Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht (1928), reprinted in STAATSRECHT-
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identity in a catalogue of fundamental rights. Because the Com-
munity is developing into areas where it affects the population 
more and more, such an identification could well help to im-
prove the legitimacy of the system as a whole. It seems very 
doubtful that the Community should draft its own catalogue of 
fundamental rights. It would not be surprising if no consensus 
on the formulation of important principles could be reached by 
European governments at the present time.75 
VIII. SOME PREDICTIONS 
Paul Kauper, who was my teacher in constitutional law when I 
studied as a foreign graduate student at the University of Michi-
gan Law School in 1957-1958, once wrote an article describing 
human rights as a tide in the history of mankind.76 Of course the 
tide is always coming and going. If I am not mistaken, there 
have been high and low tides in the development of the protec-
tion of civil rights within the national system of the United 
States even during the last years. An international system for 
the protection of fundamental rights is certainly much more re-
stricted by its political climate. 
If one or two of the bigger European states ceased to adhere to 
the right to individual application under article 25 of the Con-
vention, the system would encounter great difficulties. An old 
Swiss claim is that there should be no foreign judges interfering 
with national conditions. Members of the Commission and of 
the Court are to the greatest possible extent foreign judges look-
ing into very internal matters. Let us hope that these organs will 
be able during the coming years to gain the confidence of the 
citizens in Europe, and through them of the governments and 
ruling elites. Although we should not take it for granted, there 
seems to be a growing awareness of the possibilities created by 
the Convention in countries where the national judicial system is 
not too well developed. One can witness a most interesting side 
effect of the Convention system in that respect. Advocates who 
realize that the existence of a general consensus in all or most 
countries may be important for the Convention organs will try 
to use a comparative method in arguing their position. 
LICHE ABHANDLUNGEN 119 (2d ed. 1968). 
75. Frowein, Europiiische Grundrechtsprobleme, in 2 DAS EUROPA DER ZWEITEN GEN-
ERATION, GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FtlR CHRISTOPH SASSE 727, 737 (1981). 
76. Kauper, Human Rights: A Tide in the Affairs of Men, U. MICH. L. QUADRANGLE 
NOTES, Spring 1969, at 11. 
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It was a special occasion when, in a case before the Commis-
sion, an English advocate referred to a decision by the Federal 
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany. He 
tried to convince the Commission and later the Court that they 
should take the same approach. From time to time one may find 
that through the Convention procedures, a specific legal experi-
ence of one country may be transformed into a general system. 
The same would seem to be true for the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. 
The system we are working with is still of a very modest na-
ture. However, it is the only international or supranational sys-
tem for the protection of fundamental human rights that really 
functions in a judicial manner. Let us hope that it can develop 
smoothly. 

